In whose benefit? Explaining regulatory change in global politics

The Politics of Global Regulation

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 20-43

  Mattli, Walter ^a   Woods, Ngaire ^b  

^a ST JOHN S COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84884779155     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (192)

1. Joseph Stiglitz, Making GlobalizationWork: The Next Steps to Global Justice (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 3.
2. Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: Norton, 2002).
3. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, 13.
4. Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
5. Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
6. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "The Transformation of the World Trading System through the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization," European Journal of International Law 6 (1995), 161-221.
7. These questions differ markedly from the focus on the implications to state sovereignty that have dominated analyses of the globalization of regulation.
8. Philip Cerny, "Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy," European Journal of Political Research 36, no. 1 (August 1999), 1-26.
9. Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
10. Rodney Hall and Thomas Biersteker, eds., The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
11. Saskia Sassen, "Territory and Territoriality in the Global Economy," International Sociology 15, no. 2 (2000), 372-393.
12. In their study in this project, Abbott and Snidal use the acronym ANIME to refer to these stages: Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State," this volume.
13. Kathryn Sikkink, "From State Responsibility to Individual Criminal Accountability: A New Regulatory Model for Core Human Rights Violations," this volume.
14. Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance," International Organization 54 (2000), 421-56.
15. Walter Mattli, "The Politics and Economics of International Institutional Standards Setting: An Introduction," Journal of European Public Policy 8, no. 3 (June 2001), 328-344.
16. Dieter Kerwer, "Rules that Many Use: Standards and Global Regulation," Governance 18, no. 4 (October 2005), 611-632.
17. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, Private Authority and International Affairs (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999).
18. Philipp Pattberg, "The Institutionalization of Private Governance: How Business and Nonprofit Organizations Agree on Transnational Rules," Governance 18, no. 4 (October 2005), 589-610.
19. John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
20. Another recent contribution, rooted in sociological institutionalism, is Marie-Laure Djelic and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, eds., Transnational Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
21. Braithwaite and Drahos, 629.
22. Beth Simmons, "International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation," International Organization 55 (Summer 2001), 589-620.
23. If new hegemonic regulation renders nonconforming jurisdiction relatively costly or risky sites for conducting business, a logical competitive move for a regulator is to emulate hegemonic regulation to maintain or attract business. In the contrary case where new hegemonic regulation renders a nonconforming jurisdiction a more attractive site for business, the regulator of such jurisdiction may choose to diverge.
24. Simmons, "International Politics of Harmonization," 596.
25. When no externality is felt, the United States remains indifferent about whether the rest of the world follows its regulation.
26. Simmons, "International Politics of Harmonization," 600.
27. Beth Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett, "Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism," International Organization 60 (Fall 2006), 781-810.
28. Duane Swank, "Tax Policy in an Era of Internationalization: Explaining the Spread of Neoliberalism," International Organization 60 (Fall 2006), 847-882.
29. Chang Kil Lee and David Strang, "The International Diffusion of Public-Sector Downsizing: Network Emulation and Theory-Driven Learning," International Organization 60 (Fall 2006), 883-909.
30. David Levi-Faur and Jacint Jordana, The Rise of Regulatory Capitalism: The Global Diffusion of a New Order, special issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 598 (March 2005).
31. To paraphrase Lee and Strang, while in epidemiology the disease rather than the remedy is infectious, in the diffusion literature the reverse seems true (Lee and Strang, "The International Diffusion of Public-Sector Downsizing," 892). However, the "disease" may be global and transnational regulation may be a response by many to a systemic risk or crisis.
32. Daniel Drezner, All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
33. Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), especially 15-35.
34. Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), chap. 2.
35. Anthony Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), chap. 3.
36. Alfred Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).
37. James Landis, The Administrative Process (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1938).
38. Robert Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941). Baldwin and Cave note that public interest theory of regulation may complement "functionalist" accounts of regulatory origins and developments insofar as functionalism sees regulation as largely driven by the nature of the task at hand (as identified in terms of public needs and interests) rather than by private, individual, or self-interests (Baldwin and Cave, Understanding Regulation, 19).
39. George Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (Spring 1971), 137-146; reprinted in Kurt Leube and Thomas Moore, eds., The Essence of Stigler (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 1986), 243-264.
40. Sam Peltzman, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation?" Journal of Law and Economics 19 (August 1976), 211-240.
41. Gary Becker, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (August 1983), 371-400.
42. Richard Posner, "Theories of Economic Regulation," The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5, no. 2 (1974), 335-358.
43. Robert Tollison, "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos 35 (1982), 576-602. An influential older publication is Marver Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955).
44. Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1969), chapters 3-4.
45. Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).
46. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," 246.
47. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961).
48. JamesWilson, "The Politics of Regulation," in JamesWilson, ed., The Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 357-394, 369.
49. The theoretical case for decentralization is made by William Bratton and Joseph McCary, "The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-BestWorld," Georgetown Law Journal (November 1997), but note the competing empirical evidence against decentralization presented by Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
50. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
51. Peter Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrialized States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).
52. Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
53. John Olsen, "Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16, no. 1 (2006), 1-24; and for a contrasting approach, Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
54. Pendleton Herring, Public Administration and the Public Interest (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1936).
55. Glendon Schubert, The Public Interest (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960).
56. Carl Friedrich, ed., Nomos V: The Public Interest (New York: Atherton Press, 1962).
57. Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967, first published by Chicago: University of Chicago Press in 1908).
58. Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Rights (New York: Basic Books, 1970).
59. David Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1971, first published in 1951).
60. Frank Sorauf, "The Public Interest Reconsidered," Journal of Politics 19 (November 1957), 616-639.
61. Anthony Downs, "The Public Interest: Its Meaning in a Democracy," Social Research 29 (Spring 1962), 1-36.
62. J. A. Gunn, "Jeremy Bentham and the Public Interest," Canadian Journal of Political Science 1 (December 1968), 398-413.
63. Michael Marmon, "Administrative Policy Formation and the Public Interest," Public Administration Review 29 (September/ October 1969), 484-491.
64. Clarke Cochrane, "Political Science and 'The Public Interest'," Journal of Politics 36 (May 1974), 327-355.
65. Mike Feintuck, 'The Public Interest' in Regulation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
66. Numerous typologies of such schools have been proposed in the literature. The three schools mentioned in this section overlap with most typologies.
67. Downs, "The Public Interest," 11; see also discussion of this school in Schubert, The Public Interest.
68. Bentley, The Process of Government.
69. Truman, The Governmental Process.
70. Glendon Schubert, "'The Public Interest' in Administrative Decision-Making," American Political Science Review 51 (June 1957), 346-368.
71. Schubert, "The Theory of 'The Public Interest' in Judicial Decision-Making," Midwest Journal of Political Science 2 (February 1958).
72. Frank Sorauf, "The Conceptual Muddle," in Friedrich, Nomos V: The Public Interest, 183-190.
73. Herring, Public Administration and Public Interest.
74. Harmon, Administrative Policy Formation and the Public Interest.
75. Emmette Redford, Democracy in the Administrative State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).
76. Richard Stewart, "The Reformation of American Administrative Law," Harvard Law Review 88 (1975), 1667-1813.
77. Daniel Esty, "Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law," Yale Law Journal 115 (May 2006), 1490-1562. The "proceduralist" label is suggested by Cochrane, "Political Science and 'The Public Interest'," 342.
78. Procedural fairness and justice is a major theme in the book by Tom Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). In social choice language, the Arrow problem says that there is no necessary public interest. However, a set of legitimate procedures can lead to structurally induced "public interest" seen as acceptable by all. (We thank Duncan Snidal for this formulation.)
79. The challenge is to design mechanisms that optimize the gains from wide societal participation without losing the capacity to make decisions in an efficient and representative manner.
80. Esty, "Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law," 1521.
81. Jerry Mashaw, "Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law," University of Pittsburgh Law Review 57 (1996), 405-441.
82. Abbott and Snidal, "The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State," this volume.
83. Miles Kahler and David Lake, "Economic Integration and Global Governance: Why So Little Supranationalism?" this volume.
84. A similar point was made earlier in Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe, "Global Private Governance," in Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard Stewart, and Jonathan Wiener, eds., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, special issue of Law and Contemporary Problems 68 (Summer/Autumn 2005), 225-262, especially 226-227. Not one public exists but multiple publics or groups. We thus prefer to use the term of common rather than (single) public interest.
85. Downs, "The Public Interest," 12.
86. Susanne Lohmann, "An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests," American Political Science Review 92 (December 1998), 809-827.
87. Martin Shapiro has similarly argued that administrative law maximizing transparency and participation has the paradoxical effect of maximizing transparency and participation for "the interested" (typically interest groups) and minimizing them for "the disinterested" (typically the average citizen). Shapiro provides as an example the EU comitology process and writes: "While virtually every interest group finds a place on the committees, European citizens are generally unaware that the committees even exist." Martin Shapiro, "Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance," Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 8 (2001), 369-377, 373.
88. Martin Shapiro, "Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance," Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 8 (2001), 369-377
89. Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and BarryWeingast, "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3 (Fall 1987), 243-277, especially 262.
90. See, for example, the case of Collective Action Clauses in Helleiner, "Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance? The Politics of Regulating Sovereign Debt Restructuring," this volume.
91. David Vogel, "The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct," this volume.
92. Abbott and Snidal, "The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State," this volume.
93. Abbott and Snidal, "The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State," this volume.
94. Mattli and Büthe, "Global Private Governance."
95. The examples are drawn, in part, from Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard Stewart, "The Emergence of Global Administrative Law," Law and Contemporary Problems, 15-61.
96. Steve Suppan, Consumers International's Decision-Making in the Global Market, Codex Briefing Paper (2004) at http://www.tradeobservatory.org/ library.cfm?RefID=36988, accessed on February 6, 2007.
97. Dana Clark, Jonathan Fox, and Kay Treakle, eds., Demanding Accountability: Civil-Society Claims and theWorld Bank Inspection Panel (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
98. Gudmundur Alfredsson and Rolf Ring, eds., The Inspection Panel of the World Bank: A Different Complaints Procedure (Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers, 2000).
99. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard Stewart, "The Emergence of Global Administrative Law," in B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, R. Steward, and J.Wiener, eds., special issue of Law and Contemporary Problems, 31-34.
100. http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/.
101. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard Stewart, and Jonathan Wiener, "Foreword: Global Governance as Administration-National and Translational Approaches to Global Administrative Law," Law and Contemporary Problems 68 (Summer/Autumn 2005), 4. The authors define "global administrative law" as "comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions they make," 17.
102. Esty, "Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Global Administrative Law."
103. Kingsbury, Krisch, Stewart, and Wiener, "Foreword: Global Governance as Administration- National and Translational Approaches to Global Administrative Law," 3.
104. Kahler and Lake, "Economic Integration and Global Governance: Why So Little Supranationalism?" this volume.
105. Helleiner, "Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance? The Politics of Regulating Sovereign Debt Restructuring," this volume.
106. Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane, "Accountability and Abuses of Power inWorld Politics," American Political Science Review 99 (2005), 29-43.
107. Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe, "Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power?" World Politics 53 (2003), 1-43.
108. Mattli and Büthe, "Global Private Governance."
109. Ramana Dhara and Rosaline Dhara, "The Union Carbide Disaster in Bhopal: A Review of Health Effects," Archives of Environmental Health 57, no. 5 (September/October 2002), 391-404. The casualty figure is from the Union CarbideWeb site: www.bhopal.com/ chrono.htm.
110. "India's Disaster," Time, December 17, 1984.
111. Nirmala George, "Thousands Commemorate Bhopal Industrial Disaster," USA Today, March 12, 2004.
112. Joseph Rees, "Development of Communitarian Regulation in the Chemical Industry," Law and Policy 19, no. 4 (1997), 477-528.
113. Andrew King and Michael Lenox, "Industry Self-regulation without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program," Academy of Management Journal 43, no. 4 (2000), 698-716.
114. "The Thalidomide Disaster," Time, Friday, August 10, 1962.
115. Henning Sjöström and Robert Nilsson, Thalidomide and the Power of the Drug Companies (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1972).
116. Trent Stephens and Rock Brynner, Dark Remedy: The Impact of Thalidomide and Its Revival as a Vital Medicine (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing, 2001).
117. Revealingly, the passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was itself motivated by a national disaster-the 1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide scandal that cost the lives of 105 people, many of them children being treated for sore throats or ear infections. The Elixir contained a deadly poison normally used as an antifreeze. Prior to the 1938 Act, no laws existed requiring safety studies on new drugs; the U.S. pharmaceutical industry had long opposed costly safety requirements.
118. Paul Wax, "Elixirs, Diluents, and the Passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act," History of Medicine 122, no. 6 (1995), 456-461.
119. "Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident," FDA Consumer Magazine (June 1981) at www.fda.gov/oc/history/elixir.html.
120. John Braithwaite, Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984).
121. EEC (Council) Directives 65/65/EEC, 75/318/EEC, and 75/319/EEC.
122. A concise summary of causes is offered by Luis Lederman (Acting Head of the Safety Assessment Section in the IAEA Department of Nuclear Safety), "Nuclear Safety Aspects,"' IAEA 38, no. 3 (1996).
123. Grigori Medvedev, No Breathing Room: The Aftermath of Chernobyl (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
124. Alla Yaroshinskaya, Chernobyl: The Forbidden Truth (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995).
125. The estimates of likely deaths vary widely; some are as high as 70,000. For an excellent source of information on Chernobyl, see "IAEA Report-In Focus: Chernobyl" at www .iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Chernobyl, accessed January 16, 2007.
126. the WHO Chernobyl report entitled Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes at www.who.int/ionizing-radiation/chernobyl/who_chernobyl_report _2006pdf.
127. Chris Busby and Alexey Yablokov, eds., Chernobyl: 20 Years On (Aberystwyth: Green Audit Press, 2006).
128. OECD, Public Participation in Nuclear Decision-Making (Paris: OECD, 1993). Braithwaite and Drahos note: "This is one area where, in the battle between diffuse public interests and the concentrated interest of the industry association, the latter is losing . . . In no other area of regulation does the direct sovereignty of citizens have so much influence over specific regulatory decisions."
129. Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 309.
130. Helleiner, "Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance? The Politics of Regulating Sovereign Debt Restructuring," this volume.
131. Sikkink, "From State Responsibility to Individual Criminal Accountability: A New Regulatory Model for Core Human Rights Violations," this volume.
132. Samuel Barrows, "Racing to the Top . . . At Last: The Regulation of Safety in Shipping," this volume.
133. Vogel, "The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct," this volume.
134. Abbott and Snidal, "The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State," this volume.
135. Anthony Downs, "Up and Down With Ecology-The "Issue-Attention Cycle," Public Interest 28 (Summer 2001), 38.
136. Richard Barnett and Ronald Mueller, Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974).
137. S. Litvac and T. Maule, "The Multinational Firm and Conflicting National Interests," Journal of World Trade 3 (1969), 309-316.
138. Seymore Rubin, "Multinational Enterprises and National Sovereignty: A Skeptic's Analysis," Law and Policy in International Business 3, no. 1 (1971), 1-41.
139. Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, 193.
140. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics.
141. Wilson, "The Politics of Regulation," 369.
142. Michael Pertschuk, Revolt against Regulation: The Rise and Pause of the Consumer Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 5-45.
143. Wilson, "The Politics of Regulation," 385.
144. Sikkink, "From State Responsibility to Individual Criminal Accountability: A New Regulatory Model for Core Human Rights Violations," this volume.
145. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
146. David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
147. Abbott and Snidal, Barrows, Helleiner, and Vogel, this volume.
148. Vogel, "The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct," this volume.
149. We mentioned courts in the discussion of institutional supply of oversight mechanisms. In that section, courts are passive actors. Courts can also be activist, in which case we classify them as public entrepreneurs. Laffont and Tirole offer a similar distinction; they write: "We are here taking a passive view of the role of courts. That is, they act on hard information transmitted by various parties (i.e., whistle-blowers, including consumers, mass media, discontented or idealistic civil servants, etc.) and content themselves with correcting deviations from what is specified in the constitution . . . Courts may exert a more activist role and act on the basis of soft information. They then have discretionary power and compete with the executive and legislative branches in filling in unforeseen contingencies" (Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, "The Politics of Government Decision Making: Regulatory Institutions," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6 (Spring 1990), 1-31, 5. The question of why some judges or public officials more generally become activists as opposed to servants to capture forces is deep and highly relevant but beyond the scope of this study.
150. Wilson, "The Politics of Regulation," 385-386.
151. McCubbins, Noll, andWeingast, "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," 272.
152. Martin Shapiro, "'Deliberative', 'Independent' Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will the Globe Echo the EU?" Law and Contemporary Problems 68 (Summer/Autumn 2005), 356.
153. Richard Stewart, "The Reformation of American Administrative Law," Harvard Law Review (1975), 1667.
154. Cass Sunstein, "Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946," Virginia Law Review 72 (1986), 271-296. In addition, legal doctrinal developments since the 1980s, in conjunction with new civil procedures, have made class actions, multi-districting, and consolidation possible. This has allowed groups concerned, for example, with the health risks of tobacco to launch salvos of lawsuits against tobacco companies and contribute to changing tobacco from a virtually unregulated drug to one whose advertising is banned and consumption in public places prohibited (Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, 374).
155. Richard Stewart, "US Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?" Law and Contemporary Problems 68 (2005), 63-108, 79.
156. Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration," International Organization 47 (1993), 44-76.
157. Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Revisiting the European Court of Justice," International Organization 52 (1998), 177-209.
158. Judith Goldstein and Richard Steinberg, "Regulatory Shift: The Rise of Judicial Liberalization at the WTO," this volume.
159. Sikkink, "From State Responsibility to Individual Criminal Accountability: A New Regulatory Model for Core Human Rights Violations," this volume.
160. For more examples and discussion, see Abbott and Snidal, "The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State," this volume.
161. Abraham Newman, "Building Transnational Civil Liberties: Transgovernmental Entrepreneurs and the European Data Privacy Directive," International Organization 62, no. 1 (2008), 103-130.
162. Christopher Hood, Explaining Economic Policy Reversals (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994), 31.
163. Jill Hills, Deregulating Telecoms: Competition and Control in the United States, Japan, and Britain (London: Pinter, 1986).
164. Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk, The Politics of Deregulation, 174-206.
165. Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, 319.
166. Joseph Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
167. Rees, Hostages of Each Other, 45.
168. www.wano.org.uk.
169. The data are posted on its Web site.
170. Kiran Verma, Barry M. Mitnick, Alfred A. Marcus, "Making Incentive Systems Work: Incentive Regulation in the Nuclear Power Industry," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 9, no. 3 (July 1999), 395-436.
171. Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, 436.
172. Jack Plano, International Approaches to the Problems of Marine Pollution, Institute for the Study of International Organization Monograph Series, no. 7 (Sussex: University of Sussex, 1972). At the domestic level, insurers have similarly been key promoters of regulatory change. For example, in alliance with consumer groups, they have ensured the success of campaigns for compulsory airbag installation in motor vehicles; and they assisted effective tobacco regulation, for example, by threatening to withdraw insurance coverage from companies that failed to protect workers and the public from passive smoking.
173. Barrows, "Racing to the Top . . . At Last: The Regulation of Safety in Shipping," this volume. For a discussion of the role of insurers in global environmental regulation, see Deborah Saunders Davenport, Global Environmental Negotiations and US Interests (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 201-202.
174. Vogel, "The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct," this volume.
175. EU Directive 1836/93.
176. Kelly Kollman and Aseem Prakash, "Green By Choice? Cross-National Variations in Firms' Responses to EMS-Based Environmental Regimes," World Politics 53 (April 2001), 399-430.
177. Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, 265-266 and 281.
178. Marc Levy, "European Acid Rain: The Power of Tote-Board Diplomacy," in Peter Haas, Robert Keohane, and Marc Levy, eds., Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 95.
179. Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, 265. For more examples of the "level playing field" logic.
180. Elizabeth DeSombre, "Baptists and Bootleggers for the Environment: The Origins of United States Unilateral Sanctions," Journal of Environment and Development 4 (1995), 53-75.
181. David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
182. David Vogel and Robert Kagan, eds., Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalization Affects National Regulatory Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
183. Abbott and Snidal, Barrows, and Vogel.
184. Sikkink, "From State Responsibility to Individual Criminal Accountability: A New Regulatory Model for Core Human Rights Violations," this volume.
185. Helleiner, "Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance? The Politics of Regulating Sovereign Debt Restructuring," this volume.
186. Sikkink, "From State Responsibility to Individual Criminal Accountability."
187. David Graham and Ngaire Woods, "Making Corporate Self-Regulation Effective in Developing Countries," in Dana Brown and NgaireWoods, eds., Making Global Self-Regulation Effective in Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
188. James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989).
189. Jonathan Baert Wiener, "Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context," Yale Law Journal 108, no. 4 (January 1999), 677-800.
190. Helleiner, "Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance? The Politics of Regulating Sovereign Debt Restructuring," this volume. A similar narrowing of participation to private actors is traced by Jayne Godfrey and Ian Langfield-Smith in respect of Australia's adoption of global accounting standards: "Regulatory Capture in the Globalisation of Accounting Standards," Environment and Planning 37 (Autumn 2005), 1975-1993.
191. Sikkink, "From State Responsibility to Individual Criminal Accountability: A New Regulatory Model for Core Human Rights Violations," this volume.
192. Vogel, "The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct," this volume.