Reputation and cooperation: Guzman on international law

International Theory

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 295-305

  Kydd, Andrew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MILWAUKEE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956244103     PISSN: 17529719     EISSN: 17529727     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1752971909990066     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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14. Schultz K.A. (2001), Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.