Coercive enforcement of international law

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 502-523

  Thompson, Alexander ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84922261424     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139107310.025     Document Type: Chapter

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