Reputation in international relations and international law theory

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 524-543

  Brewster, Rachel ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84928277520     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139107310.026     Document Type: Chapter

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