How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory

How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-304

  Guzman, Andrew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Coercive enforcement; International law; International relations; Prisoner's dilemma; Rational choice theory; Reciprocity; Risk; Tribunals

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921389440     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305562.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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