Norm, network, and commons: The invisible hand of community

Environmental Science and Policy

Volumn 36, Issue , 2014, Pages 73-85

  Lejano, Raul P ^a   Fernandez de Castro, Francisco ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COMMUNITY; COOPERATION; ECONOMICS; EMPATHY; HUMAN; INSTITUTIONALIZATION; MOTIVATION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RECYCLING; SOCIAL NETWORK; SOCIALIZATION;

EID: 84892481724     PISSN: 14629011     EISSN: 18736416     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.envsci.2013.07.012     Document Type: Article

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