Collective action, property rights, and decentralization in resource use in India and Nepal

Politics and Society

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 485-514

  Agrawal, Arun ^a   Ostrom, Elinor ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0035540978     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329201029004002     Document Type: Article

References (96)

1. William Dillinger, Decentralization and Its Implications for Urban Service Delivery. Urban Management Program Discussion Paper No. 16 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1994), 8.
2. The global pursuit of decentralization, even if it appears novel, has had several precursors. Beginning in 1917, four waves of decentralization can be discerned in Francophone West Africa according to Jesse Ribot, "Decentralization, Participation, and Accountability in Sahelian Forestry: Legal Instruments of Political-Administrative Control," Africa, 69 (August 1999): 23-65. Arun Agrawal and Jesse Ribot, "Accountability in Decentralization: A Framework with South Asian and West African Cases," Journal of Developing Areas, 33 (summer 1999): 495 identify at least three waves of decentralization in south Asia since the mid-1800s.
3. The global pursuit of decentralization, even if it appears novel, has had several precursors. Beginning in 1917, four waves of decentralization can be discerned in Francophone West Africa according to Jesse Ribot, "Decentralization, Participation, and Accountability in Sahelian Forestry: Legal Instruments of Political-Administrative Control," Africa, 69 (August 1999): 23-65. Arun Agrawal and Jesse Ribot, "Accountability in Decentralization: A Framework with South Asian and West African Cases," Journal of Developing Areas, 33 (summer 1999): 495 identify at least three waves of decentralization in south Asia since the mid-1800s.
4. There is a close relationship between the willingness of governments to decentralize powers to lower level decision makers in a polity and the ability of citizens to influence decision making by participating more intensively in governance, even if the relationship is hard to specify precisely. The ability of governments to foster participation has been termed "state-fostered civic organizing" by Rebecca Abers, "From Clientalism to Cooperation: Local Government, Participatory Policy, and Civic Organizing in Porto Alegre, Brazil," Politics and Society, 26, no. 4 (December 1998): 511.
5. See the essays in Tariq Banuri and Frederique Apffel Marglin, eds., Who Will Save the Forests? Knowledge, Power, and Environmental Destruction (London: Zed Books, 1993); and Michael Kaufman and Haroldo Dilla Alfonso, eds., Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: The Transformation of Social Life (London: Zed Books, 1997). A number of scholars have also made similar arguments about development in book-length studies. See Julie Fisher, Non Governments: NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998); and Richard C. Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). William Ascher, Why Governments Waste Natural Resources: Policy Failures in Developing Countries (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 269-71 reviews the natural resource management policies of a host of governments, and recommends decentralization to private and communal actors.
6. See the essays in Tariq Banuri and Frederique Apffel Marglin, eds., Who Will Save the Forests? Knowledge, Power, and Environmental Destruction (London: Zed Books, 1993); and Michael Kaufman and Haroldo Dilla Alfonso, eds., Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: The Transformation of Social Life (London: Zed Books, 1997). A number of scholars have also made similar arguments about development in book-length studies. See Julie Fisher, Non Governments: NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998); and Richard C. Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). William Ascher, Why Governments Waste Natural Resources: Policy Failures in Developing Countries (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 269-71 reviews the natural resource management policies of a host of governments, and recommends decentralization to private and communal actors.
7. See the essays in Tariq Banuri and Frederique Apffel Marglin, eds., Who Will Save the Forests? Knowledge, Power, and Environmental Destruction (London: Zed Books, 1993); and Michael Kaufman and Haroldo Dilla Alfonso, eds., Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: The Transformation of Social Life (London: Zed Books, 1997). A number of scholars have also made similar arguments about development in book-length studies. See Julie Fisher, Non Governments: NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998); and Richard C. Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). William Ascher, Why Governments Waste Natural Resources: Policy Failures in Developing Countries (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 269-71 reviews the natural resource management policies of a host of governments, and recommends decentralization to private and communal actors.
8. See the essays in Tariq Banuri and Frederique Apffel Marglin, eds., Who Will Save the Forests? Knowledge, Power, and Environmental Destruction (London: Zed Books, 1993); and Michael Kaufman and Haroldo Dilla Alfonso, eds., Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: The Transformation of Social Life (London: Zed Books, 1997). A number of scholars have also made similar arguments about development in book-length studies. See Julie Fisher, Non Governments: NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998); and Richard C. Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). William Ascher, Why Governments Waste Natural Resources: Policy Failures in Developing Countries (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 269-71 reviews the natural resource management policies of a host of governments, and recommends decentralization to private and communal actors.
9. See the essays in Tariq Banuri and Frederique Apffel Marglin, eds., Who Will Save the Forests? Knowledge, Power, and Environmental Destruction (London: Zed Books, 1993); and Michael Kaufman and Haroldo Dilla Alfonso, eds., Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: The Transformation of Social Life (London: Zed Books, 1997). A number of scholars have also made similar arguments about development in book-length studies. See Julie Fisher, Non Governments: NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998); and Richard C. Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). William Ascher, Why Governments Waste Natural Resources: Policy Failures in Developing Countries (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 269-71 reviews the natural resource management policies of a host of governments, and recommends decentralization to private and communal actors.
10. For a careful political study of decentralization that highlights the territorial aspects of the exercise of power, see Brian C. Smith, Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), especially pp. 1-6.
11. Peter Evans, "A Virtuous Cycle Model of Rural-Urban Development: Evidence from a Kenyan Small Town and its Hinterland," Journal of Development Studies, 28, no. 4 (April 1992): 135-53; Philip Mawhood, Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 1983); and James S. Wunsch and Dele Olowu, The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990).
12. Peter Evans, "A Virtuous Cycle Model of Rural-Urban Development: Evidence from a Kenyan Small Town and its Hinterland," Journal of Development Studies, 28, no. 4 (April 1992): 135-53; Philip Mawhood, Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 1983); and James S. Wunsch and Dele Olowu, The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990).
13. Peter Evans, "A Virtuous Cycle Model of Rural-Urban Development: Evidence from a Kenyan Small Town and its Hinterland," Journal of Development Studies, 28, no. 4 (April 1992): 135-53; Philip Mawhood, Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 1983); and James S. Wunsch and Dele Olowu, The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990).
14. M. Goodwin, S. Duncan, and S. Halford, "Regulation Theory, the Local State, and the Transition of Urban Politics," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 11, no. 1 (February 1993): 67-88; and R. Rhodes, Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: The Sub-Central Governments of Britain (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
15. M. Goodwin, S. Duncan, and S. Halford, "Regulation Theory, the Local State, and the Transition of Urban Politics," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 11, no. 1 (February 1993): 67-88; and R. Rhodes, Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: The Sub-Central Governments of Britain (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
16. This article brackets the question of when local groups will self-organize. For a careful analysis of this question, see Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chap. 6; and Elinor Ostrom, "Reformulating the Commons," In J. Burger, E. Ostrom, R. B. Norgaard, D. Policansky, and B. D. Goldstein, eds., Protecting the Commons: A Framework for Resource Management in the Americas (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2001), 17-41.
17. This article brackets the question of when local groups will self-organize. For a careful analysis of this question, see Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chap. 6; and Elinor Ostrom, "Reformulating the Commons," In J. Burger, E. Ostrom, R. B. Norgaard, D. Policansky, and B. D. Goldstein, eds., Protecting the Commons: A Framework for Resource Management in the Americas (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2001), 17-41.
18. For definitions of these terms and their relationship to decentralization, see Dennis Rondinelli, James McCullough, and Ronald Johnson, "Analyzing Decentralization Policies in Developing Countries: A Political-Economic Approach," Development and Change, 20, no. 1 (January 1989): 76; Elinor Ostrom, Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne, Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 164-68; Michael Maniates, "Organizational Designs for Achieving Sustainability: The Opportunities, Limitations, and Dangers of State-local Collaboration for Common Property Managemen," (presented at the First Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Durham, NC, 27-30 September 1990), 1; Devraj Dahal, The Challenge of Good Governance: Decentralization and Development in Nepal (Kathmandu, Nepal: Center for Governance and Development Studies, 1996), 15; and Paul Smoke, "Local Government Fiscal Reform in Developing Countries: Lessons from Kenya," World Development, 21, no. 6 (June 1993): 901-3. It is clear that a very large literature elaborates the meanings of decentralization.
19. For definitions of these terms and their relationship to decentralization, see Dennis Rondinelli, James McCullough, and Ronald Johnson, "Analyzing Decentralization Policies in Developing Countries: A Political-Economic Approach," Development and Change, 20, no. 1 (January 1989): 76; Elinor Ostrom, Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne, Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 164-68; Michael Maniates, "Organizational Designs for Achieving Sustainability: The Opportunities, Limitations, and Dangers of State-local Collaboration for Common Property Managemen," (presented at the First Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Durham, NC, 27-30 September 1990), 1; Devraj Dahal, The Challenge of Good Governance: Decentralization and Development in Nepal (Kathmandu, Nepal: Center for Governance and Development Studies, 1996), 15; and Paul Smoke, "Local Government Fiscal Reform in Developing Countries: Lessons from Kenya," World Development, 21, no. 6 (June 1993): 901-3. It is clear that a very large literature elaborates the meanings of decentralization.
20. For definitions of these terms and their relationship to decentralization, see Dennis Rondinelli, James McCullough, and Ronald Johnson, "Analyzing Decentralization Policies in Developing Countries: A Political-Economic Approach," Development and Change, 20, no. 1 (January 1989): 76; Elinor Ostrom, Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne, Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 164-68; Michael Maniates, "Organizational Designs for Achieving Sustainability: The Opportunities, Limitations, and Dangers of State-local Collaboration for Common Property Managemen," (presented at the First Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Durham, NC, 27-30 September 1990), 1; Devraj Dahal, The Challenge of Good Governance: Decentralization and Development in Nepal (Kathmandu, Nepal: Center for Governance and Development Studies, 1996), 15; and Paul Smoke, "Local Government Fiscal Reform in Developing Countries: Lessons from Kenya," World Development, 21, no. 6 (June 1993): 901-3. It is clear that a very large literature elaborates the meanings of decentralization.
21. For definitions of these terms and their relationship to decentralization, see Dennis Rondinelli, James McCullough, and Ronald Johnson, "Analyzing Decentralization Policies in Developing Countries: A Political-Economic Approach," Development and Change, 20, no. 1 (January 1989): 76; Elinor Ostrom, Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne, Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 164-68; Michael Maniates, "Organizational Designs for Achieving Sustainability: The Opportunities, Limitations, and Dangers of State-local Collaboration for Common Property Managemen," (presented at the First Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Durham, NC, 27-30 September 1990), 1; Devraj Dahal, The Challenge of Good Governance: Decentralization and Development in Nepal (Kathmandu, Nepal: Center for Governance and Development Studies, 1996), 15; and Paul Smoke, "Local Government Fiscal Reform in Developing Countries: Lessons from Kenya," World Development, 21, no. 6 (June 1993): 901-3. It is clear that a very large literature elaborates the meanings of decentralization.
22. For definitions of these terms and their relationship to decentralization, see Dennis Rondinelli, James McCullough, and Ronald Johnson, "Analyzing Decentralization Policies in Developing Countries: A Political-Economic Approach," Development and Change, 20, no. 1 (January 1989): 76; Elinor Ostrom, Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne, Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 164-68; Michael Maniates, "Organizational Designs for Achieving Sustainability: The Opportunities, Limitations, and Dangers of State-local Collaboration for Common Property Managemen," (presented at the First Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Durham, NC, 27-30 September 1990), 1; Devraj Dahal, The Challenge of Good Governance: Decentralization and Development in Nepal (Kathmandu, Nepal: Center for Governance and Development Studies, 1996), 15; and Paul Smoke, "Local Government Fiscal Reform in Developing Countries: Lessons from Kenya," World Development, 21, no. 6 (June 1993): 901-3. It is clear that a very large literature elaborates the meanings of decentralization.
23. Mawhood, Local Government; Smith, Decentralization, 1-3.
24. Mawhood, Local Government; Smith, Decentralization, 1-3.
25. As John R. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968) has observed, a property right is an enforceable authority to undertake particular actions in a specific domain.
26. Daniel Bromley et al., eds., Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1992).
27. According to a survey of Forest Departments by the Food and Agriculture Organization, more than 50 countries claim to be moving toward involving user communities in some form in the management of forest resources. See Food and Agriculture Organization, "Status and Progress in the Implementation of National Forest Programmes: Outcomes of an FAO Worldwide Survey," mimeo (Rome, Italy: FAO, 1999).
28. For a detailed discussion of these different types of rights, see Edella Schlager and Elinor Ostrom, "Property Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," Land Economics, 68, no. 3 (August 1992): 249-62. In response to referees' requests to keep this analysis as simple as possible, we do not discuss a fifth right identified in the above article - the right of access. A decentralization policy gives local users effective access rights when they receive some rights of harvest. But access as a separable right is important if one is analyzing parks and other institutional arrangements where access alone is granted to some actors.
29. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), chap. 2.
30. Analysis of decisions as occurring at nested levels is developed at greater length in James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); George Brennan and James Buchanan, The Reason of Rules (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Larry Kiser and Elinor Ostrom, "The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches," in Elinor Ostrom, ed., Strategies of Political Inquiry (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), 179-222. A concise treatment is available in Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 50-55.
31. Analysis of decisions as occurring at nested levels is developed at greater length in James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); George Brennan and James Buchanan, The Reason of Rules (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Larry Kiser and Elinor Ostrom, "The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches," in Elinor Ostrom, ed., Strategies of Political Inquiry (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), 179-222. A concise treatment is available in Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 50-55.
32. Analysis of decisions as occurring at nested levels is developed at greater length in James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); George Brennan and James Buchanan, The Reason of Rules (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Larry Kiser and Elinor Ostrom, "The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches," in Elinor Ostrom, ed., Strategies of Political Inquiry (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), 179-222. A concise treatment is available in Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 50-55.
33. Analysis of decisions as occurring at nested levels is developed at greater length in James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); George Brennan and James Buchanan, The Reason of Rules (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Larry Kiser and Elinor Ostrom, "The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches," in Elinor Ostrom, ed., Strategies of Political Inquiry (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), 179-222. A concise treatment is available in Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 50-55.
34. See Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review, 57 (May 1967): 347-59.
35. Not all scholars agree. Bruce Larson and Daniel Bromley, "Property Rights, Externalities, and Resource Degradation: Locating the Tragedy," Journal of Development Economics, 32, no. 2 (October 1990): 235-62, show that much more information about the specific values of a large number of ownership parameters is necessary before judgments can be made concerning the efficiency of a property right.
36. Operational rights may be finely divided into quite specific and, sometimes, overlapping "tenure niches" that vary by season, by use, by technology, and by space as discussed by John Bruce, Louise Fortmann, and Calvin Nhira, "Tenures in Transition, Tenures in Conflict: Examples from the Zimbabwe Social Forest," Rural Sociology, 58, no. 4 (1993): 626-42. Operational rules can permit authorized users to transfer access and withdrawal rights either temporarily through a rental agreement, or permanently when these rights are assigned or sold to others.
37. For studies of how collective management-related rights are exercised in relation to fisheries, see Bikash Raychaudhuri, The Moon and the Net: Study of a Transient Community of Fishermen at Jambudwip (Calcutta: Anthropological Survey of India, Government of India Press, 1980); for irrigation, see Shui Yan Tang, Institutions and Collective Action: Self-Governance in Irrigation (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1992); and for forestry, see George Varughese and Elinor Ostrom, "The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Evidence from Community Forestry in Nepal," World Development, 29, no. 5 (May 2001); George Varughese, "Villagers, Bureaucrats, and Forests in Nepal: Designing Governance for a Complex Resource," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1999.
38. For studies of how collective management-related rights are exercised in relation to fisheries, see Bikash Raychaudhuri, The Moon and the Net: Study of a Transient Community of Fishermen at Jambudwip (Calcutta: Anthropological Survey of India, Government of India Press, 1980); for irrigation, see Shui Yan Tang, Institutions and Collective Action: Self-Governance in Irrigation (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1992); and for forestry, see George Varughese and Elinor Ostrom, "The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Evidence from Community Forestry in Nepal," World Development, 29, no. 5 (May 2001); George Varughese, "Villagers, Bureaucrats, and Forests in Nepal: Designing Governance for a Complex Resource," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1999.
39. For studies of how collective management-related rights are exercised in relation to fisheries, see Bikash Raychaudhuri, The Moon and the Net: Study of a Transient Community of Fishermen at Jambudwip (Calcutta: Anthropological Survey of India, Government of India Press, 1980); for irrigation, see Shui Yan Tang, Institutions and Collective Action: Self-Governance in Irrigation (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1992); and for forestry, see George Varughese and Elinor Ostrom, "The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Evidence from Community Forestry in Nepal," World Development, 29, no. 5 (May 2001); George Varughese, "Villagers, Bureaucrats, and Forests in Nepal: Designing Governance for a Complex Resource," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1999.
40. For studies of how collective management-related rights are exercised in relation to fisheries, see Bikash Raychaudhuri, The Moon and the Net: Study of a Transient Community of Fishermen at Jambudwip (Calcutta: Anthropological Survey of India, Government of India Press, 1980); for irrigation, see Shui Yan Tang, Institutions and Collective Action: Self-Governance in Irrigation (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1992); and for forestry, see George Varughese and Elinor Ostrom, "The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Evidence from Community Forestry in Nepal," World Development, 29, no. 5 (May 2001); George Varughese, "Villagers, Bureaucrats, and Forests in Nepal: Designing Governance for a Complex Resource," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1999.
41. See Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 204-5; Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne, Institutional Incentives, 51-54.
42. See Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 204-5; Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne, Institutional Incentives, 51-54.
43. The essays in several collected volumes show the importance of institutional regulation of common property at the local level. See Daniel Bromley, David Feeny, Margaret McKean, Pauline Peters, Jere Gilles, Ronald Oakerson, Carlisle Ford Runge, and James Thompson, eds., making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1992); and Bonnie J. McCay and James Acheson, ed., The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1987).
44. The essays in several collected volumes show the importance of institutional regulation of common property at the local level. See Daniel Bromley, David Feeny, Margaret McKean, Pauline Peters, Jere Gilles, Ronald Oakerson, Carlisle Ford Runge, and James Thompson, eds., making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1992); and Bonnie J. McCay and James Acheson, ed., The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1987).
45. In a series of studies of inshore fisheries, self-organized irrigation systems, forest user groups, and groundwater institutions, proprietors tended to develop strict boundary rules to exclude noncontributors, establishment authority rules to allocate withdrawal rights, devised methods for monitoring conformance, and used graduated sanctions against those who do not conform to these rules. See the empirical essaysin Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, 219-300.
46. J. Arnold and Gabriel Campbell, "Collective Management of Hill Forests in Nepal: The Community Forestry Development Project," in Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management (Washigton, DC: National Research Council, National Academy Press, 1986): 425-54, point to the effect uncertainties of tenure produce among agriculture producers.
47. Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare: Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes (New York: Harper, 1963).
48. See Demsetz, "Towards a Theory," 350-52.
49. Frank Place and Peter Hazell, "Productivity Effects of Indigenous Land Tenure Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa," American Journal of Agriculture Economics, 75 (1993): 10-19 conducted surveys in Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda to ascertain if indigenous land-right systems were a constraint on agriculture productivity. They found that having the rights of a proprietor as contrasted to an owner in these settings did not affect investment decisions and productivity. Some other studies from Africa have also found little difference in productivity, investment levels, or access to credit purely as a result of more rights. See Shem E. Migot-Adholla, Peter Hazell, Benoit Blarel, Frank Place, "Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?" World Bank Economic Review, 5, no.1 (1991): 155-75; John W. Bruce and Shem e. Midot-Adholla, eds., Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 1994). In densely settled regions, however, proprietorship over agriculture land may not be sufficient for efficient exploitation as argued by Gershon Feder and David Feeny, "Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development Policy," World Bank Economic Review, 5, no.1 (1991): 135-53; and Gershon Feder, T. Onchan, Y. Chalamwong, and C. Hangladoran, Land Policies and Farm Productivity in Thailand (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).
50. Frank Place and Peter Hazell, "Productivity Effects of Indigenous Land Tenure Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa," American Journal of Agriculture Economics, 75 (1993): 10-19 conducted surveys in Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda to ascertain if indigenous land-right systems were a constraint on agriculture productivity. They found that having the rights of a proprietor as contrasted to an owner in these settings did not affect investment decisions and productivity. Some other studies from Africa have also found little difference in productivity, investment levels, or access to credit purely as a result of more rights. See Shem E. Migot-Adholla, Peter Hazell, Benoit Blarel, Frank Place, "Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?" World Bank Economic Review, 5, no.1 (1991): 155-75; John W. Bruce and Shem e. Midot-Adholla, eds., Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 1994). In densely settled regions, however, proprietorship over agriculture land may not be sufficient for efficient exploitation as argued by Gershon Feder and David Feeny, "Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development Policy," World Bank Economic Review, 5, no.1 (1991): 135-53; and Gershon Feder, T. Onchan, Y. Chalamwong, and C. Hangladoran, Land Policies and Farm Productivity in Thailand (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).
51. Frank Place and Peter Hazell, "Productivity Effects of Indigenous Land Tenure Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa," American Journal of Agriculture Economics, 75 (1993): 10-19 conducted surveys in Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda to ascertain if indigenous land-right systems were a constraint on agriculture productivity. They found that having the rights of a proprietor as contrasted to an owner in these settings did not affect investment decisions and productivity. Some other studies from Africa have also found little difference in productivity, investment levels, or access to credit purely as a result of more rights. See Shem E. Migot-Adholla, Peter Hazell, Benoit Blarel, Frank Place, "Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?" World Bank Economic Review, 5, no.1 (1991): 155-75; John W. Bruce and Shem e. Midot-Adholla, eds., Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 1994). In densely settled regions, however, proprietorship over agriculture land may not be sufficient for efficient exploitation as argued by Gershon Feder and David Feeny, "Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development Policy," World Bank Economic Review, 5, no.1 (1991): 135-53; and Gershon Feder, T. Onchan, Y. Chalamwong, and C. Hangladoran, Land Policies and Farm Productivity in Thailand (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).
52. Frank Place and Peter Hazell, "Productivity Effects of Indigenous Land Tenure Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa," American Journal of Agriculture Economics, 75 (1993): 10-19 conducted surveys in Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda to ascertain if indigenous land-right systems were a constraint on agriculture productivity. They found that having the rights of a proprietor as contrasted to an owner in these settings did not affect investment decisions and productivity. Some other studies from Africa have also found little difference in productivity, investment levels, or access to credit purely as a result of more rights. See Shem E. Migot-Adholla, Peter Hazell, Benoit Blarel, Frank Place, "Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?" World Bank Economic Review, 5, no.1 (1991): 155-75; John W. Bruce and Shem e. Midot-Adholla, eds., Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 1994). In densely settled regions, however, proprietorship over agriculture land may not be sufficient for efficient exploitation as argued by Gershon Feder and David Feeny, "Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development Policy," World Bank Economic Review, 5, no.1 (1991): 135-53; and Gershon Feder, T. Onchan, Y. Chalamwong, and C. Hangladoran, Land Policies and Farm Productivity in Thailand (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).
53. Frank Place and Peter Hazell, "Productivity Effects of Indigenous Land Tenure Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa," American Journal of Agriculture Economics, 75 (1993): 10-19 conducted surveys in Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda to ascertain if indigenous land-right systems were a constraint on agriculture productivity. They found that having the rights of a proprietor as contrasted to an owner in these settings did not affect investment decisions and productivity. Some other studies from Africa have also found little difference in productivity, investment levels, or access to credit purely as a result of more rights. See Shem E. Migot-Adholla, Peter Hazell, Benoit Blarel, Frank Place, "Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?" World Bank Economic Review, 5, no.1 (1991): 155-75; John W. Bruce and Shem e. Midot-Adholla, eds., Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 1994). In densely settled regions, however, proprietorship over agriculture land may not be sufficient for efficient exploitation as argued by Gershon Feder and David Feeny, "Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development Policy," World Bank Economic Review, 5, no.1 (1991): 135-53; and Gershon Feder, T. Onchan, Y. Chalamwong, and C. Hangladoran, Land Policies and Farm Productivity in Thailand (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).
54. See Arun Agrawal, "Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use," in Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, adn James M. Walker, eds., Rules, Games, adn Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 267-82; William Blomquist, Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern California (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992); Edella Schlager, "Fishers' Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas," in Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker, eds., Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 247-65; Shui Yan Tang, "Building Community Organizations: Credible Commitment and the New Institutional Economics," Human Systems Management, 13 (1994): 221-32; and Wai Fung Lam, Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal: Institutions, Infrastructure, and Collective Action (Oakland, CA: ICS Press, 1994).
55. See Arun Agrawal, "Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use," in Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, adn James M. Walker, eds., Rules, Games, adn Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 267-82; William Blomquist, Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern California (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992); Edella Schlager, "Fishers' Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas," in Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker, eds., Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 247-65; Shui Yan Tang, "Building Community Organizations: Credible Commitment and the New Institutional Economics," Human Systems Management, 13 (1994): 221-32; and Wai Fung Lam, Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal: Institutions, Infrastructure, and Collective Action (Oakland, CA: ICS Press, 1994).
56. See Arun Agrawal, "Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use," in Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, adn James M. Walker, eds., Rules, Games, adn Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 267-82; William Blomquist, Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern California (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992); Edella Schlager, "Fishers' Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas," in Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker, eds., Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 247-65; Shui Yan Tang, "Building Community Organizations: Credible Commitment and the New Institutional Economics," Human Systems Management, 13 (1994): 221-32; and Wai Fung Lam, Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal: Institutions, Infrastructure, and Collective Action (Oakland, CA: ICS Press, 1994).
57. See Arun Agrawal, "Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use," in Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, adn James M. Walker, eds., Rules, Games, adn Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 267-82; William Blomquist, Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern California (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992); Edella Schlager, "Fishers' Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas," in Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker, eds., Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 247-65; Shui Yan Tang, "Building Community Organizations: Credible Commitment and the New Institutional Economics," Human Systems Management, 13 (1994): 221-32; and Wai Fung Lam, Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal: Institutions, Infrastructure, and Collective Action (Oakland, CA: ICS Press, 1994).
58. See Arun Agrawal, "Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use," in Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, adn James M. Walker, eds., Rules, Games, adn Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 267-82; William Blomquist, Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern California (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992); Edella Schlager, "Fishers' Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas," in Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker, eds., Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 247-65; Shui Yan Tang, "Building Community Organizations: Credible Commitment and the New Institutional Economics," Human Systems Management, 13 (1994): 221-32; and Wai Fung Lam, Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal: Institutions, Infrastructure, and Collective Action (Oakland, CA: ICS Press, 1994).
59. We can point out in passing that decentralization of all the rights - use (or withdrawal), management, exclusion, and alienation - only facilitates self-organization. Not all local groups will self-organize to manage local forests sustainably just because central governments are willing to devolve authority. Self-organization by users requires overcoming local barriers to collective action as well.
60. For a comprehensive review, see Arun Agrawal and Clark Gibson, "Community and Conservation: Beyond Enchantment and Disenchantment," World Development, 27, no. 4 (1999): 629-49.
61. See Arun Agrawal and Gautam Yadama, "How do Local Institutions Mediate Market and Population Pressures on Resources? Forest Panchayats in Kumaon, India," Development and Change, 28, no. 3 (July 1997): 435-66.
62. E. Somanathan, "Deforestation, Property Rights, and Incentives in Central Himalaya," Economic and Political weekly, 26 (1991): 37-46.
63. Agrawal and Yadama, "How do Local Institutions," 447.
64. See Arun Agrawal, "State Formation in Community Spaces? Decentralization of Control over Forests in the Kumaon Himalaya, India," Journal of Asian Studies,60, no. 1 (February 2001): 1-32.
65. For a discussion of changing colonial forestry policies in Bengal, see K. Sivaramakrishnan, Modern Forests: Statemaking and Environmental Change in Colonial Eastern India (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). Careful studies of forest history in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh are available respectively in Ajay Skaria, Hybrid Histories: Forests, Frontiers, and Wilderness in Western India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Nandini Sundar, Subalterns and Sovereigns: An Anthropological History of Bastar, 1854-1996 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998).
66. For a discussion of changing colonial forestry policies in Bengal, see K. Sivaramakrishnan, Modern Forests: Statemaking and Environmental Change in Colonial Eastern India (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). Careful studies of forest history in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh are available respectively in Ajay Skaria, Hybrid Histories: Forests, Frontiers, and Wilderness in Western India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Nandini Sundar, Subalterns and Sovereigns: An Anthropological History of Bastar, 1854-1996 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998).
67. For a discussion of changing colonial forestry policies in Bengal, see K. Sivaramakrishnan, Modern Forests: Statemaking and Environmental Change in Colonial Eastern India (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). Careful studies of forest history in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh are available respectively in Ajay Skaria, Hybrid Histories: Forests, Frontiers, and Wilderness in Western India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Nandini Sundar, Subalterns and Sovereigns: An Anthropological History of Bastar, 1854-1996 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998).
68. Shashi Kolavalli, "Joint Forest Management: Superior Property rights?" Economic and Political Weekly, 30 (29 July 1995): 1933-38; and Ajit Krishnaswamy, "Sustainable Development and Community Forest Management in Bihar, India," Society and Natural Resources, 8 (1995): 339-50.
69. Shashi Kolavalli, "Joint Forest Management: Superior Property rights?" Economic and Political Weekly, 30 (29 July 1995): 1933-38; and Ajit Krishnaswamy, "Sustainable Development and Community Forest Management in Bihar, India," Society and Natural Resources, 8 (1995): 339-50.
70. Nandini Sundar, "Unpacking the 'Joint' in Joint Forest Management," Development and Change, 31, no. 1 (January 2000): 255-60.
71. Dolly Arora, "From State Regulation to People's Participation: Case of Forest Management in India," Economic and Political Weekly, 29 (19 March 1994): 691-98.
72. Mark Poffenberger and Chhatrapati Singh, "Communities and State: Reestablishing the Balance in India Forest Policy," in Mark Poffenberger and Betsy McGean, eds., Village Voices, Forest Choices (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 58-59.
73. Rucha Ghate, "The role of Autonomy in Self-Organizing Processes: A Case Study of Local Forest Management in India," mimeo (Bloomington: Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, 2000), 10.
74. Richard Mahapatra, "Community Forest Management: The Nepalese Experience," Down to Earth, 8, no.9 (September 2000): 1-10; See also the essays in Roger Jeffery and Nandini Sundar, eds., A New Moral Economy for India's Forests? Discourses of Community and Participation (Sage: New Delhi, 1999).
75. Richard Mahapatra, "Community Forest Management: The Nepalese Experience," Down to Earth, 8, no.9 (September 2000): 1-10; See also the essays in Roger Jeffery and Nandini Sundar, eds., A New Moral Economy for India's Forests? Discourses of Community and Participation (Sage: New Delhi, 1999).
76. Neeraj Kumar, "All is Not Green with Joint Forest Management in India," Forests, Trees, and People Newsletter, 42(2000): 46-50; Sundar, "Unpacking the 'Joint,'"275-77.
77. Neeraj Kumar, "All is Not Green with Joint Forest Management in India," Forests, Trees, and People Newsletter, 42(2000): 46-50; Sundar, "Unpacking the 'Joint,'"275-77.
78. Several case studies available in Mark Poffenberger and Betsy McGean, eds., Village Voices, Forest Choices (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), provide local assessments. See also the recent study by Arvind Khare, Madhu Sarin, N.C. Saxena, Subhabrata Palit, Seema Bathla, Farhad Vaina, and M. Satyanarayana, Joint Forest Management: Policy, Practice and Prospects (London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 2000) for a more recent, general account.
79. Several case studies available in Mark Poffenberger and Betsy McGean, eds., Village Voices, Forest Choices (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), provide local assessments. See also the recent study by Arvind Khare, Madhu Sarin, N.C. Saxena, Subhabrata Palit, Seema Bathla, Farhad Vaina, and M. Satyanarayana, Joint Forest Management: Policy, Practice and Prospects (London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 2000) for a more recent, general account.
80. "State Forestry Action Programme," Public speech by Inspector General of Forests, Indian Institute of Forest Management, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, 21 January 2000.
81. Khare et al., Joint Forest Management, 2-8; Kumar. "All is not Green," 48-50.
82. Khare et al., Joint Forest Management, 2-8; Kumar. "All is not Green," 48-50.
83. Arnold and Campbell. "Collective Management." 440-44.
84. Joel Meinen and B. Kattel, "A Review of Conservation Legislation in Nepal: Past Progress and Future Needs," Environmental Management, 16 (1992): 723-33.
85. As with any policy of this kind, the manner of implementation of the law is sometimes more arbitrary and less participatory than it is at other times. A 1995 study of 419 "chairpersons" of forest committees uncovered that "most of them did not know if they were members of a forest committee, or what they were expected to do." Charla Britt, "Forestry and Forest Policies," Working paper (Bloomington: Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, 2000), 22.
86. There is an initiative currently under consideration to tax the revenue that user groups obtain under this program; see Mahapatra, "Community Forest Management," 7-8.
87. Mahapatra, "Community Forest Management," 8; see also George Varughese, "Population and Forest Dynamics in the Hills of Nepal: Institutional Remedies by Rural Communities," in Clark Gibson, Margaret A. McKean, and Elinor Ostrom, eds., People and Forests: Communities, Institutions, and Governance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 193-227.
88. Britt, "Forestry and Forest Policies," 27.
89. Sanjay Nepal and K. Weber, "A Buffer Zone for Biodiversity Conservation: Viability of the Concept in Nepal's Royal Chitwan National Park," Environmental Conservation, 21 (1994): 333. See also N. Iswharan and W. Erdelen, "Conserving Sunharaja: An Expertment in Sustainable Development in Sri Lanka," Ambio, 12 (1990): 237-44.
90. Sanjay Nepal and K. Weber, "A Buffer Zone for Biodiversity Conservation: Viability of the Concept in Nepal's Royal Chitwan National Park," Environmental Conservation, 21 (1994): 333. See also N. Iswharan and W. Erdelen, "Conserving Sunharaja: An Expertment in Sustainable Development in Sri Lanka," Ambio, 12 (1990): 237-44.
91. See Arun Agrawal, Shree Govind Shah, Mukunda Karmacharya, and Birendra Karna, "Conservation with Communities: The Parks and People Program in Nepal," Evaluation Report of the Parks and People Program, UNDP (Kathmandu, Nepal: International Forest Resources and Institutions Program, Nepal, 1999).
92. Ibid., 42-47. See also "Terai's Forest-Challenge for Management," Spotlight: The National News Magazine, 20, no. 35 (March 16-22, 2001), for a critical review of the level of illegal harvesting occurring in the Terai of Nepal, where the People and Parks Program is located.
93. Ibid., 42-47. See also "Terai's Forest-Challenge for Management," Spotlight: The National News Magazine, 20, no. 35 (March 16-22, 2001), for a critical review of the level of illegal harvesting occurring in the Terai of Nepal, where the People and Parks Program is located.
94. That the forest councils of Kumaon have existed the longest and were created by a colonial government also sets them apart from the other cases in our set. However, these two distinguishing factors seem to us less important in explaining their success. The British colonial state had also initiated programs of environmental decentralization in Madras and Burma. In both these places, the effort at decentralized management of forests was launched before it was in Kumaon. However, the programs in Burma and Madras were scrapped in favor of centralized management within four decades. The determining factors in the success of the councils seem to be the match between local mobilization and support within the Revenue Department and the institutional measures that this congruence of interests provoked.
95. Somanathan, "Deforestation, Property Rights," pp. 42-45.
96. For a review of alarmist arguments in the 1970s and early 1980s, see Jack Ives and Bruno Messerli, The Himalayan Dilemma: Reconciling Development and Conservation (London: Routledge, 1989).