Network formation and social coordination

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 178-207

  Goyal, Sanjeev ^a,b   Vega Redondo, Fernando ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

^b ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

^d UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Coordination games; Efficiency; Equilibrium selection; Links; Networks; Risk dominance

Indexed keywords

EID: 11244350022     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.01.005     Document Type: Article

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