What Explains Collective Action in the Commons? Theory and Evidence from the Philippines

World Development

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 687-697

  Araral Jr , Eduardo ^a  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Asia; collective action; commons; decentralization; free riding; irrigation; Philippines

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; DECENTRALIZATION; ECONOMETRICS; IRRIGATION SYSTEM; RESOURCE SCARCITY; WATER RESOURCE; WATER SUPPLY;

ASIA; EURASIA; PHILIPPINES; SOUTHEAST ASIA;

EID: 59649097448     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.08.002     Document Type: Article

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