What motivates common pool resource users? Experimental evidence from the field

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 70, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 485-497

  Velez, Maria Alejandra ^a   Stranlund, John K ^b   Murphy, James J ^c  

^a UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES   (Colombia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Altruism; Common pool resources; Conformity; Experiments; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957002922     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.02.008     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. Andreoni J., Miller J.H. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma: experimental evidence. The Economic Journal 1993, 103:570-585.
2. Bardsley N. Interpersonal interaction and economic theory: the case of public goods. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 2000, 71:191-238.
3. Bardsley N., Sausgruber R. Conformity and reciprocity in public good provision. Journal of Economic Psychology 2005, 26:664-681.
4. Bolton G.E., Ockenfels A. ERC: a theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. The American Economic Review 2000, 90:166-193.
5. Bornstein G., Ben-Yossef M. Cooperation in intergroup and single-group social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology 1994, 30:52-67.
6. Bowles S. Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions and Evolution 2003, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
7. Cardenas J.C., Stranlund J., Willis C. Local environmental control and institutional crowding out. World Development 2000, 28:1719-1733.
8. Cardenas J.C., Ostrom E. What do people bring into the game? Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons. Agricultural Systems 2004, 82:307-326.
9. Cardenas J.C. Groups, commons and regulations: experiments with students and villagers in Colombia. Psychology, Rationality and Economic Behaviour: Challenging Standard Assumptions 2004, 242-270. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. B. Agarwal, A. Vercelli (Eds.).
10. Carpenter J.P. When in Rome: conformity and the provision of public goods. Journal of Socio-Economics 2004, 33:395-408.
11. Casari M., Plott C.R. Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2003, 51:217-247.
12. Cornes R., Sandler T. On commons and tragedies. The American Economic Review 1983, 73:787-792.
13. Croson R.T.A. Theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity: evidence from linear public good games. Economic Inquiry 2007, 45:199-216.
14. Cox J.C. How to identify trust and reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior 2004, 46:260-281.
15. Falk A., Fehr E., Fischbacher U. Appropriating the commons-a theoretical explanation. The Drama of the Commons 2002, 157-192. National Academy Press, Washington, DC. R. Dietz, N. DolŠak, E. Ostrom, P. Stern, S. Stonich, E. Weber (Eds.).
16. Fehr E., Fischbacher U. Why social preferences matter: the impact of non-selfish motives on competition, cooperation and incentives. The Economic Journal 2002, 112:C1-C33.
17. Fehr E., Gächter S. Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2000, 14(3):159-181.
18. Fehr E., Schmidt K.M. A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1999, 114:817-868.
19. Fischbacher U., Gächter S., Fehr E. Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters 2001, 71:397-404.
20. Frey B., Meier S. Social comparisons and pro-social behavior: testing 'conditional cooperation' in a field experiment. The American Economic Review 2004, 94:1717-1722.
21. Harrison G.W., List J.A. Field experiments. Journal of Economic Literature 2004, 52:1009-1055.
22. Henrich J., Boyd R. Why people punish defectors: weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. Journal of Theoretical Biology 2001, 208:79-89.
23. Henrich J. Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2004, 53:3-35.
24. Henrich J., Boyd R., Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H., McElreath R., Alvard M., Barr A., Ensminger J., Hill K., Gil-White F., Gurven M., Marlowe F., Patton J.Q., Smith N., Tracer D. Economic man in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2005, 28:795-855.
25. Keser C., Gardner R. Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game. International Journal of Game Theory 1999, 28:241-252.
26. Komorita S.S., Parks C.D., Hulbert L.G. Reciprocity and the induction of cooperation in social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1992, 62:607-617.
27. Kreps D.M., Milgrom P., Roberts J., Wilson R. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 1982, 27:245-252.
28. Kurzban R., Houser D. Experiments investigating cooperative types in humans: a complement to evolutionary theory and simulations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 2005, 102:1803-1807.
29. Kurzban R., McCabe K., Smith V.L., Wilson B.J. Incremental commitment and reciprocity in a real-time public good game. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 2001, 27:1573-1662.
30. Levine D.K. Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Review of Economic Dynamics 1998, 1:593-622.
31. Levitt S.D., List J.A. What do laboratory experiments measuring social preferences reveal about the real world?. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2007, 21(2):153-174.
32. Luzzati T. Economic theory and conformity. Beyond the Representative Agent 1999, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. M. Gallegati, A. Kirman (Eds.).
33. McElreath R., Lubell M., Richerson P.J., Warning T.M., Baum W., Edsten E., Efferson C., Paciotti B. Applying evolutionary models to the laboratory study of social learning. Evolution and Human Behavior 2005, 26:483-508.
34. Ostrom E., Walker J., Gardner R. Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible. American Political Science Review 1992, 86:404-417.
35. Ostrom E., Walker J., Gardner R. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources 1994, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI.
36. Sobel J. Interdependent preferences and reciprocity. Journal of Economic Literature 2005, 43:392-436.
37. Smith J.M., Bell P.A. Conformity as a determinant of behavior in a resource dilemma. Journal of Social Psychology 1994, 134:191-201.
38. Sugden R. Reciprocity: the supply of public goods through voluntary contributions. The Economic Journal 1984, 94:772-787.
39. Velez, M.A., Murphy, J.J., Stranlund, J.K. Centralized and decentralized management of local common pool resources in the developing world: experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia. Economic Inquiry, forthcoming.
40. Walker J., Gardner R., Ostrom E. Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: experimental evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 1990, 19:203-211.
41. Yamagishi T., Sato K. Motivational bases of the public goods problem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1986, 50:67-73.