The challenge of understanding decisions in experimental studies of common pool resource governance

Ecological Economics

Volumn 70, Issue 9, 2011, Pages 1571-1579

  Anderies, John M ^a   Janssen, Marco A ^a   Bousquet, François ^b   Cardenas, Juan Camilo ^c   Castillo, Daniel ^d   Lopez, Maria Claudio ^d   Tobias, Robert ^e   Vollan, Björn ^f   Wutich, Amber ^a  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CIRAD   (France)

^c UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES   (Colombia)

^d PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD JAVERIANA   (Colombia)

^e SWISS FEDERAL INSTITUTE OF AQUATIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Switzerland)

^f UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Collective action; Common pool resources; Context; Experimental economics; Methodology

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; COMMUNICATION; DECISION MAKING; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; RESOURCE USE;

EID: 79958257524     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.01.011     Document Type: Article

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