Modeling the commons as a game with vector payoffs

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 66-89

  Lejano, Raul P ^a   Ingram, Helen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

commons; game theory; rationality; vector payoffs

Indexed keywords

EID: 83255164160     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629811423120     Document Type: Article

References (90)

1. Agranoff R,McGuire M.Managing in network settings.Policy Studies Review. 1999;16:18-41.
2. Anderson T,Hill PJThe Not So Wild, Wild West: Property Rights on the Frontier. Stanford: Stanford University Press; 2004:.
3. Aumann RJ,Shapley LSSanta Monica: Rand; 1976:.
4. Axelrod RThe Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books; 1985:.
5. Baden J,Stroup R,Thurman W.Myths, admonitions and rationality: the American Indian as a resource manager.Economic Inquiry. 1981;19 (1): 132-143.
6. Barr AFoundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. Henrich JBoyd RBowles SCamerer CFehr EGintis H, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2004:305-335.
7. Benhabib J,Radner R.The joint exploitation of a productive asset: a game-theoretic approach.Economic Theory. 1992;2:155-190.
8. Berkes FThe Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources. McCay BJAcheson J, ed. Tucson: University of Arizona Press; 1987:66-91.
9. Berkes F,Colding J,Folke CNavigating Social-Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity and Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2003:.
10. Bolton G.A cooperative model of bargaining: theory and evidence.American Economic Review. 1991;81 (5): 1096-1129.
11. Bolton GE,Zwick R.Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining.Games and Economic Behavior. 1995;10:95-121.
12. Borm P,van Megen F,Tijs S.A perfectness concept for multicriteria games.Mathematical Methods of Operations Research. 1999;49:401-412.
13. Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy. Bromley DWFeeny D, ed. San Francisco: ICS Press; 1992:.
14. Casari M,Plott CR.Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution.Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2003;51:217-247.
15. Cason TN,Khan FU.A laboratory study of voluntary public goods provision with imperfect monitoring and communication.Journal of Development Economics. 1999;58:533-552.
16. Cave J.Long-term competition in a dynamic game: the cold fish war.The RAND Journal of Economics. 1987;18:596-610.
17. Ciriacy-Wantrup SV,Bishop RC.'Common Property' as a concept in natural resource policy.Natural Resources Journal. 1975;15:713-727.
18. Clark C (1980) Restricted access to common-property fishery resources: a game-theoretic analysis.In: Liu PT (ed.) Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics, New York: Plenum Press,117-132.
19. Coase R.The problem of social cost.Journal of Law and Economics. 1960;3:1-44.
20. Copeland BR,Taylor MS.Trade, tragedy, and the commons.American Economic Review. 2009;99 (3): 725-749.
21. Dasgupta PS,Heal GMEconomic Theory and Exhaustible Resources. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1979:.
22. Dawes RM, van de Kragt AJC and Orbell JM (1990) Cooperation for the benefit of us-not me, or my conscience. In: Mansbridge, J (ed.) Beyond Self-Interest. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
23. Dawkins RThe Selfish Gene. 1989) The Selfish Gene. 2nd ed.Oxford: Oxford University Press.Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1989:.
24. Dietz T,Ostrom E,Stern PC.The struggle to govern the commons.Science. 2003;302:1907-1911.
25. Dixit A.Social formation of pro-social preferences. For presentation at the conference in honor of Howard Kunreuther, held at the Wharton School; 2008University of Pennsylvania; 2008.
26. Dutta PK.A folk theorem for stochastic games.Journal of Economic Theory. 1995;66:1-32.
27. Eckel CC,Grossman PJ.Altruism in anonymous dictator games.Games and Economic Behavior. 2006;16:181-191.
28. Eckersley RThe Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 2004:.
29. Etzioni A.The case for a multiple-utility conception.Economics and Philosophy. 1986;2:159-183.
30. Feeny D,Berkes F,McCay B,Acheson J.The tragedy of the commons: twenty-two years later.Human Ecology. 1990;18 (1): 1-19.
31. Fehr E,Schmidt KM.A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation.Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1999;114 (3): 817-868.
32. Flescher AM,Worthen DLThe Altruistic Species: Scientific, Philosophical, and Religious Perspectives of Human Benevolence. Philadelphia and London: Templeton Foundation Press; 2007:.
33. Flores D.Bison ecology and bison diplomacy: the Southern Plains from 1800 to 1850.The Journal of American History. 1991;78 (2): 465-485.
34. Forsythe R,Horowitz JL,Savin NE,Martin S.Fairness in simple bargaining experiments.Games and Economic Behavior. 1994;6:347-369.
35. Friedman DThe Machinery of Freedom: Guide to Radical Capitalism. New York: Harper & Row; 1973:.
36. Frohlich N,Oppenheimer J.Skating on thin ice: cracks in the public choice foundation.Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2006;18 (3): 235-266.
37. Frohlich N,Oppenheimer J,Kurki A.Modeling other-regarding preferences and an experimental test.Public Choice. 2004;119 (1-2): 91-117.
38. Gillet J,Schram A,Sonnemans J.The tragedy of the commons revisited: the importance of group decision-making.Journal of Public Economics. 2009;5-6:785-797.
39. Gordon SS.The economic theory of a common-property resource: the fishery.Journal of Political Economy. 1954;62:124-142.
40. Goyal S,Vega-Redondo F.Learning, network formation and coordination.Games and Economic Behavior. 2005;50 (2): 178-207.
41. Hämäläinen PComanche Empire. The Lamar Series in Western History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 2008:.
42. Hanemann WH.Adaptation and its measurement.Climate Change. 2000;45:571-581.
43. Hannesson R.Fishing as a supergame.Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 1997;32 (3): 309-322.
44. Hardin G.The tragedy of the commons.Science. 1968;162:1243-1248.
45. Henrich J,Boyd R,Bowles S,Camerer C,Fehr E,Gintis HFoundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2004:.
46. Hoffman E,McCabe K,Smith VL.Social distance and other-regarding behavior in dictator games.American Economic Review. 1996;86:653-660.
47. Innes JE,Booher DEPlanning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy. New York: Routledge; 2010:.
48. Isaac RM,Walker JM.Communication and free-riding: the voluntary contribution mechanism.Economic Inquiry. 1988;26:585-605.
49. Jackson MOSocial and Economic Networks. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2008:.
50. Johannesson M,Persson B.Non-reciprocal altruism in dictator games.Economics Letters. 2000;69:137-142.
51. Kahneman D, Knetsch JL and Thaler RH (1986) Fairness and the assumptions of economics. In:Hogarth RM and Reder MW (eds) Rational Choice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,101-116.
52. Kaitala V,Pohjola M.Optimal recovery of a shared resource stock: a differential game model with efficient memory equilibria.Natural Resource Modeling. 1988;10:87-108.
53. Kay CE.Were native people keystone predators? A continuous-time analysis of wildlife observations made by Lewis and Clark in 1804-1806.Canadian Field-Naturalist. 2007;121 (1): 1-16.
54. Kickert W, Klijn E-H and Koppenjan J (1997) Introduction: a management perspective on policy networks. In: Kickert W, Klijn E-H and Koppenjan J (eds) Managing Complex Networks. London: Sage Publications, 1-13.
55. Knafo A,Salomon I,Darvasi A,Bachner-Melman R,Uzefovsky F,Cohen L,Feldman E,Lerer E,Laiba E,Raz Y,Nemanov L,Gritsenko I,Dina C,Agam G,Dean B,Bornstein G,Ebstein RP.Individual differences in allocation of funds in the dictator game associated with length of the arginine vasopressin 1a receptor (AVPR1a) RS3 promoter-region and correlation between RS3 length and hippocampal mRNA.Genes, Brain, and Behavior. 2008;7 (3): 266-275.
56. Laukkanen M.Cooperative and non-cooperative harvesting in a stochastic sequential fishery.Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2003;45:454-473.
57. Lejano RPFrameworks for Policy Analysis: Merging Text and Context. New York: Routledge; 2006:.
58. Libecap GD.The conditions of successful collective action.Journal of Theoretical Politics. 1994;6 (4): 563-592.
59. Lloyd WFTwo Lectures on the Checks to Population, delivered at the University of Oxford in Michaelmas Term, 1832. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1833:.
60. Marglin SAThe Dismal Science: How Thinking Like an Economist Undermines Community. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 2008:.
61. Margolis H (1990) Dual utilities and rational choice. In: Mansbridge JJ (ed.) Beyond Self-Interest.Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 239-253.
62. McCay BJ,Acheson JMThe Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources. Tucson: University of Arizona Press; 1987:66-91.
63. National Research Council (1986) Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
64. Orbell JM,van de Kragt AJC,Dawes RM.Explaining discussion-induced cooperation in social dilemmas.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1988;54:811-819.
65. Ostrom EGoverning the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1990:.
66. Ostrom E.How types of goods and property rights jointly affect collective action.Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2003;15 (3): 239-270.
67. Ostrom E,Burger J,Field CB,Norgaard RB,Policansky D.Revisiting the commons: local lessons, global challenges.Science. 1999;284:278-282.
68. O'Toole LJ.Treating networks seriously: practical and research-based agendas in public administration.Public Administration Review. 1991;57 (1): 45-52.
69. Podolny JM,Page KL.Network forms of organization.Annual Review of Sociology. 1998;24:57-76.
70. Poteete AR,Janssen MA,Ostrom EWorking Together: Collective Action, the Commons, and Multiple Methods in Practice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2010:.
71. Powell WW.Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of organization.Research in Organizational Behavior. 1990;12:295-336.
72. Rabin M.Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics.American Economic Review. 1993;83:1281-1302.
73. Punctuated Equilibrium and the Dynamics of U.S. Environmental Policy. Repetto R, ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 2006:.
74. Roe FGThe North American Buffalo: A Critical Study of the Species in its Wild State. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; 1951:.
75. Roth AE (1995) Bargaining experiments. In: Kagel JH and Roth AE (eds) The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 253-348.
76. Rubinstein A.Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion.Journal of Economic Theory. 1979;21:1-9.
77. Scholz J,Wang C-L.Learning to cooperate: learning networks and the problem of altruism.American Journal of Political Science. 2009;53 (3): 572-587.
78. Schulman EDendroclimatic Changes in Semi-Arid America. Tucson: University of Arizona Press; 1956:.
79. Sengupta NManaging Common Property: Irrigation in India and the Philippines. New Delhi: Sage; 1991:.
80. Shapely LS.Equilibrium points n games with vector payoffs.Naval Research Logistics. 1959;61 (1): 57-61.
81. Siegel D.Social networks and collective action.American Journal of Political Science. 2009;53 (1): 122-138.
82. TaylorSM (2007) Buffalo hunt: international trade and the virtual extinction of the North American bison. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series. www.nber.org/papers/w12969 (accessed 28 August 2010).
83. Thaler RH.Anomalies: the ultimatum game.Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1988;2:195-206.
84. Urpelainen J.The origins of social institutions.Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2011;23 (2): 215-240.
85. Wade RVillage Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India. San Francisco: ICS Press; 1994:.
86. Wallace B,Cesarini D,Lichtenstein P,Johannesson M.Heritability of ultimatum game responder behavior.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2007;104 (40): 15631-15634.
87. Wang S.An existence theorem of a Pareto equilibrium.Applied Mathematics Letters. 1991;4 (3): 61-63.
88. West EThe Way West: Essays on the Central Plains. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press; 1995:.
89. Whitt S,Wilson R.The dictator game, fairness and ethnicity in postwar Bosnia.American Journal of Political Science. 2007;51 (3): 655-668.
90. Zhao J.The equilibria of a multiple objective game.International Journal of Game Theory. 1991;20:171-182.