Analyzing collective action

Agricultural Economics

Volumn 41, Issue SUPPL. 1, 2010, Pages 155-166

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a,b  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral theory of human action; Collective action; Context; Trust

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; ECOLOGICAL APPROACH; HUMAN BEHAVIOR; LITERATURE REVIEW; NUMERICAL MODEL; RECIPROCITY;

EID: 78149451111     PISSN: 01695150     EISSN: 15740862     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1574-0862.2010.00497.x     Document Type: Article

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