Public participation and willingness to cooperate in common-pool resource management: A field experiment with fishing communities in Brazil

Ecological Economics

Volumn 69, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 613-622

  Cavalcanti, Carina ^a,b   Schläpfer, Felix ^a,b   Schmid, Bernhard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Beliefs; Deliberation; Field experiment; Fishing resources; Participation; Willingness to contribute

Indexed keywords

EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; FIELD METHOD; FISHING COMMUNITY; FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEM; PARTICIPATORY APPROACH; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT;

BRAZIL; SOUTH AMERICA;

EID: 72049105047     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.09.009     Document Type: Article

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