Corporate governance and board effectiveness

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 371-403

  John, Kose ^a   Senbet, Lemma W ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate finance; Corporate governance; G30; G32; Internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000654960     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4266(98)00005-3     Document Type: Article

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