Marketable incentive contracts and capital structure relevance

Journal of Finance

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 353-378

  Garvey, Gerald T ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040360989     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2329568     Document Type: Article

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