Optimal compensation contracts when managers can hedge

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 97, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 218-238

  Gao, Huasheng ^a  

^a NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Equity incentives; Executive compensation; Hedging

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952958531     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.03.015     Document Type: Article

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