Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 33, Issue 7, 2009, Pages 1340-1350

  Pathan, Shams ^a  

^a BOND UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Bank governance; Bank holding companies; Bank risk taking; Board of directors; CEO power

Indexed keywords

EID: 64049086212     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.02.001     Document Type: Article

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