Incentive alignment or perverse incentives?: A behavioral view of stock options

Management Research

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 109-120

  Deyá Tortella, Bartolomé ^a   Gomez Mejía, Luis R ^b   De Castro, Julio O ^c   Wiseman, Robert M ^d  

^a UNIVERSITAT DE LES ILLES BALEARS   (Spain)

^b ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c IE BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Spain)

^d MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84998844022     PISSN: 15365433     EISSN: 15580946     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/15365430580001316     Document Type: Article

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