On the determinants of the conjunction fallacy: Probability versus inductive confirmation

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Volumn 142, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 235-255

  Tentori, Katya ^a   Crupi, Vincenzo ^b   Russo, Selena ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Bayesian reasoning; Confirmation; Conjunction fallacy; Probability judgment; Representativeness

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; BAYES THEOREM; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMAN; MALE; PROBABILITY; PROBLEM SOLVING;

BAYES THEOREM; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MALE; PROBABILITY; PROBLEM SOLVING; YOUNG ADULT;

MLCS; MLOWN;

EID: 84877958796     PISSN: 00963445     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/a0028770     Document Type: Article

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