How probability theory explains the conjunction fallacy

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 213-234

  Costello, Fintan J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN   (Ireland)

Author keywords

Cognitive illusions; Conjunction fallacy; Probability; Random variation; Rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 68649126286     PISSN: 08943257     EISSN: 10990771     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.618     Document Type: Article

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