Exploring the conjunction fallacy within a category learning framework

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Volumn 21, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 471-490

  Nilsson, Håkan ^a  

^a UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Category learning; Conjunction fallacy; Representativeness heuristic; Subjective probability

Indexed keywords

EID: 55549087558     PISSN: 08943257     EISSN: 10990771     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.615     Document Type: Article

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