Testing boundary conditions for the conjunction fallacy: Effects of response mode, conceptual focus, and problem type

Cognition

Volumn 107, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 105-136

  Wedell, Douglas H ^a   Moro, Rodrigo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Conjunction fallacy; Frequency versus probability; Linguistic interpretations; Probability judgment; Response mode effects

Indexed keywords

ANALYTIC METHOD; ANALYTICAL ERROR; ARTICLE; COGNITION; COMPARATIVE STUDY; CONCEPT ANALYSIS; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMAN; MALE; NORMAL HUMAN; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY;

CHOICE BEHAVIOR; CONCEPT FORMATION; FEMALE; HUMANS; MALE; REACTION TIME;

EID: 40649106717     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2007.08.003     Document Type: Article

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