Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 182-199

  Crupi, Vincenzo ^a,b   Fitelson, Branden ^c   Tentori, Katya ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY IUAV OF VENICE   (Italy)

^b AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITY   (France)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO   (Italy)

Author keywords

Confirmation; Conjunction fallacy; Probability

Indexed keywords

EID: 43149125835     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546780701643406     Document Type: Article

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