How the conjunction fallacy is tied to probabilistic confirmation: Some remarks on Schupbach (2009)

Synthese

Volumn 184, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 3-12

  Tentori, Katya ^a,b   Crupi, Vincenzo ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TURIN   (Italy)

Author keywords

Confirmation; Conjunction fallacy; Judgmental biases; Probability; Rationality; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 83355176369     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9701-y     Document Type: Article

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