Can human rationality be defended a priori?

Behavior and Philosophy

Volumn 28, Issue 1-2, 2000, Pages 67-81

  Shier, David ^a  

^a WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 52849123583     PISSN: 10538348     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (24)

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