Towards a grammar of bayesian confirmation

EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 73-93

  Crupi, Vincenzo ^a   Festa, Roberto ^b   Buttasi, Carlo ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TURIN   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TRIESTE   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77749272200     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8_7     Document Type: Chapter

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