Optimal executive compensation when firm size follows geometric brownian motion

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 859-892

  He, Zhiguo ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 59449110938     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn037     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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