Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard

Econometrica

Volumn 78, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 73-118

  Biais, Bruno ^a   Mariotti, Thomas ^a   Rochet, Jean Charles ^b   Villeneuve, Stéphane ^b  

^a CNRS   (France)

^b TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

Continuous time; Downsizing; Firm size dynamics; Investment; Limited liability; Poisson risk; Principal agent model

Indexed keywords

EID: 76549127901     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3982/ECTA7261     Document Type: Article

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