Agency and optimal investment dynamics

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 151-188

  DeMarzo, Peter M ^a   Fishman, Michael J ^b,c  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845706110     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhl004     Document Type: Article

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