On the optimality of resetting executive stock options

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 57, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 65-101

  Acharya, Viral V ^a   John, Kose ^a   Sundaram, Rangarajan K ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO compensation; Executive stock options; G32; J33; L14; Managerial incentives; Repricing* Contract renegotiation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034215912     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00051-9     Document Type: Article

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