Figuring out the impact of hidden savings on optimal unemployment insurance

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 541-554

  Kocherlakota, Narayana R ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3242674496     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2004.01.003     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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