Optimal security design and dynamic capital structure in a continuous-time agency model

Journal of Finance

Volumn 61, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 2681-2724

  DeMarzo, Peter M ^a   Sannikov, Yuliy ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846205687     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01002.x     Document Type: Article

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