Information disclosure and corporate governance

Journal of Finance

Volumn 67, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 195-233

  Hermalin, Benjamin E ^a   Weisbach, Michael S ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855955882     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01710.x     Document Type: Article

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