Contractual flexibility, rent seeking, and renegotiation design: An empirical analysis of information technology outsourcing contracts

Management Science

Volumn 58, Issue 7, 2012, Pages 1388-1407

  Susarla, Anjana ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Contractual flexibility; Incomplete contracts; IT outsourcing; Renegotiation design; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

ADVERSE SELECTION; CONTRACTUAL FLEXIBILITY; DATA COLLECTION; DECISION RIGHT; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; ENDOGENEITY; IDENTIFICATION STRATEGIES; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OUTSOURCING; IT OUTSOURCING; RENT-SEEKING;

CONTRACTS; DESIGN; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY; PARETO PRINCIPLE; RISK MANAGEMENT; TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER;

OUTSOURCING;

EID: 84864056401     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1493     Document Type: Article

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