Reputation effects and the limits of contracting: A study of the Indian software industry

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 115, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 989-1017

  Banerjee, Abhijit V ^a   Duflo, Esther ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039619859     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355300554962     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Bajari, Patrick, and Steven Tadelis, "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," mimeo, Stanford University, 1999.
2. Crocker, Keith, and Kenneth Reynolds, "The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, XXIV (1993), 127-146.
3. Diamond, Douglas W., "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, XCVII (1989), 828-862.
4. Fama, Eugene F., "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, LXXXVIII (1980), 288-307.
5. Heckman, James, "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica, XLVII (1979), 153-161.
6. Holmstrom, Bengt, "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, XIII (1982), 324-340.
7. Kandori, Michihiro, "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economics Studies, LIX (1992), 63-80.
8. McMillan, John, and Christopher Woodruff, "Interfirm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam," Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIV (1999), 1285-1320.
9. Pressman, Roger S., Software Engineering, A Practitioner's Approach, 4th edition (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Companies, 1996).
10. Tirole, Jean, "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)," Review of Economic Studies, LXII (1996), 1-22.