Complementarity among vertical integration decisions: evidence from automobile product development

Management Science

Volumn 55, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 311-332

  Novak, Sharon ^a   Stern, Scott ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Automobile industry; Complementarity; Outsourcing strategies; Product development; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY; AUTOMOBILE SYSTEMS; COMPLEMENTARITY; DATA SETS; INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES; OUTSOURCING STRATEGIES; TRADE SECRETS; VERTICAL INTEGRATION;

OUTSOURCING; PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT; PROJECT MANAGEMENT; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

INTEGRATION;

EID: 67649974103     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0924     Document Type: Article

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