Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America. Evidence from the water and transport sectors

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 421-442

  Guasch, J Luis ^a,b   Laffont, Jean Jacques ^c,d   Straub, Stéphane ^e  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^d UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^e UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Concession contracts; LDCs; Regulation; Renegotiation

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; COST REDUCTION; DATA STRUCTURES; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; PROBABILITY; TRANSPORTATION; WATER RESOURCES;

CONCESSION CONTRACTS; INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS; RENEGOTIATION;

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION;

EID: 39149110326     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.05.003     Document Type: Article

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