Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation

Journal of Applied Econometrics

Volumn 22, Issue 7, 2007, Pages 1267-1294

  Guasch, J Luis ^a   Laffont, Jean Jacques ^b,c   Straub, Stéphane ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38549098265     PISSN: 08837252     EISSN: 10991255     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/jae.987     Document Type: Conference Paper

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