Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 200-245

  Gibbons, Robert ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Property rights; Rent seeking; Theory of the firm; Transaction costs; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

EID: 25844458618     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.010     Document Type: Article

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