Power in a theory of the firm

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 113, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 387-432

  Rajan, Raghuram G ^a   Zingales, Luigi ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010922718     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355398555630     Document Type: Article

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