Management control for market transactions: The relation between transaction characteristics, incomplete contract design, and subsequent performance

Management Science

Volumn 51, Issue 12, 2005, Pages 1734-1752

  Anderson, Shannon W ^a,b   Dekker, Henri C ^c  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

^c VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Contingency theory; Costs of contracting; Information technology; Management control; Transaction costs

Indexed keywords

CONTINGENCY THEORY; COSTS OF CONTRACTING; MANAGEMENT CONTROL; TRANSACTION COSTS;

CONTROL SYSTEMS; COSTS; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY; PROBLEM SOLVING;

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE;

EID: 29144482523     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1050.0456     Document Type: Article

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