Spillovers and governance: An analysis of knowledge and reputational spillovers in information technology

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 69-84

  Mayer, Kyle J ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646593483     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2006.20785502     Document Type: Article

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