Contractual provisions to mitigate holdup: Evidence from information technology outsourcing

Information Systems Research

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 37-55

  Susarla, Anjana ^a   Subramanyam, Ramanath ^b   Karhade, Prasanna ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^c HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Contract duration; Extendibility clauses; Holdup; Incomplete contracts; Information technology outsourcing; Underinvestment

Indexed keywords

OUTSOURCING;

EXTENDIBILITY CLAUSES; HOLDUP; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OUTSOURCING; UNDERINVESTMENT;

CONTRACTS;

EID: 77954300639     PISSN: 10477047     EISSN: 15265536     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/isre.1080.0204     Document Type: Article

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