Formal contracts in the presence of relational enforcement mechanisms: evidence from technology development projects

Management Science

Volumn 55, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 906-925

  Ryall, Michael D ^a   Sampson, Rachelle C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Alliances; Contracts; RandD; Repeated interactions

Indexed keywords

ALLIANCES; ASSOCIATED COSTS; CODING SCHEME; CONTRACT TERMS; EMPIRICAL COMPARISON; ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS; HIGH TECHNOLOGY; INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT; MICROELECTRONICS INDUSTRY; MORAL HAZARD; RANDD; RELATIONAL CONTRACTS; RELATIONAL MECHANISMS; REPEATED INTERACTIONS; TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT; TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS;

MICROELECTRONICS; RISK MANAGEMENT;

TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING;

EID: 67650924703     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1090.0995     Document Type: Article

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