Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management

Journal of Business Research

Volumn 64, Issue 12, 2011, Pages 1352-1360

  Hadani, Michael ^a   Goranova, Maria ^b   Khan, Raihan ^c  

^a LONG ISLAND UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MILWAUKEE   (United States)

^c STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT OSWEGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Earnings management; Largest institutional owner; Shareholder activism

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052870240     PISSN: 01482963     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2010.12.004     Document Type: Article

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