A requiem for the USA: Is small shareholder monitoring effective?

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 40, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 319-338

  Strickland, Deon ^a   Wiles, Kenneth W ^b   Zenner, Marc ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b Development Group Inc   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Monitoring; Ownership structure; Shareholder activism

Indexed keywords

EID: 16144367015     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(95)00849-A     Document Type: Article

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