The structure of ownership and corporate acquisition strategies

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 41-53

  Wright, Peter ^a   Kroll, Mark ^b   Lado, Augustine ^c   Van Ness, Bonnie ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS   (United States)

^b LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Acquisition performance; Agency theory; Corporate acquisition strategies; Firm risk taking

Indexed keywords

MANAGERS; RISK ASSESSMENT; RISK MANAGEMENT; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS;

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS;

EID: 0036217274     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.208     Document Type: Article

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