Block share purchases and corporate performance

Journal of Finance

Volumn 53, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 605-634

  Bethel, Jennifer E ^a   Liebeskind, Julia Porter ^a   Opler, Tim ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039403207     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.244195     Document Type: Article

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