Large shareholders as monitors: Is there a trade-off between liquidity and control?

Journal of Finance

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 65-98

  Maug, Ernst ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040428442     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.35053     Document Type: Article

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